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AFTER OBERGEFELL: THE NEXT GENERATION OF
LGBT RIGHTS LITIGATION
Nancy Levit
“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.”1
Leading up to Obergefell v. Hodges,2 the road to marriage equality was
uneven, to say the least. Several state courts in the 1970s rejected claims of the
right to same-sex marriage, principally based on definitional circular reasoning—
marriage was defined as being between one man and one woman—that avoided
the critical constitutional question.3 In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court was the
first state high court to hold that a ban on same-sex marriage constituted sex
discrimination under the state constitution.4 This sparked a legislative response
with the Hawaii legislature defining marriage as between one man and one
woman.5 This battle would replay itself in various forms in numerous states.6
The federal government quickly entered the same-sex marriage debate
and enacted the federal Defense of Marriage Act in 1996.7 DOMA purposefully
restricted the definition of marriage to a union between one man and one woman,
and it also said that no state was required to recognize the validity of a same-sex
marriage performed in another state.8 State legislatures that had not previously
passed statutes to ban same-sex marriage leaped on the bandwagon and enacted
mini-DOMAs.9 And, not content to simply legislate against same-sex marriage,
some states also passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage.10

 © 2015 Nancy Levit, Curators’ and Edward D. Ellison Professor of Law, University of Missouri –
Kansas City School of Law. This symposium had its genesis in the ambition and foresight of two
student Articles Editors, Megan Galicia and Brynne Krause. They asked good questions about the
possible aftermath of the decision long before the Supreme Court issued its opinion.
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185
(Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1974); see Nancy J. Knauer, LGBT Elders in a Post-Windsor World: The Promise and Limits
of Marriage Equality, 24 TEX. J. WOMEN, GENDER & L. 1, 20 n.105 (2014).
4 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
5 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-6 (1997).
6 See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, Hobby Lobby: The Crafty Case That Threatens Women’s Rights and
Religious Freedom, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 641, 678 (2015) (“The Vermont legislature, for
example, passed a civil unions bill after the Vermont Supreme Court ruled in 1999 that unequal
benefits for gays and heterosexuals violated the state’s Common Benefits Clause.”); Ethan J. Leib,
Hail Marriage and Farewell, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 42 (2015) (detailing the history of
California’s voter-enacted Proposition 8, which stated that only marriages between one man and
one woman would be valid, through the 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hollingsworth v.
Perry, overturning Proposition 8).
7 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012), invalidated by Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013).
8 Id.
9 Steve Sanders, Mini-DOMAs as Political Process Failures: The Case for Heightened Scrutiny of
State Anti-Gay Marriage Amendments, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 12, 14-16 (2014).
10 Stacey L. Sobel, Culture Shifting at Warp Speed: How the Law, Public Engagement, and Will &
Grace Led to Social Change for LGBT People, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 143, 161 (2015) (“In all,
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Within less than two decades the Supreme Court reversed its position on
the criminalization of sexual intimacy between consenting homosexuals. In
2003, in Lawrence v. Texas,11 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed its earlier
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick12 that had allowed prosecution for consensual
sodomy. That same year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the
state’s legislative ban on same-sex marriage “confers an official stamp of
approval on the destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently
unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of
respect.”13 In 2008, the California Supreme Court followed this lead and held
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should be evaluated on the
basis of strict scrutiny under the California constitution and found that allowing
only opposite-sex couples to marry was unconstitutional.14 Over the course of
the next several years, other states and federal district and appellate courts
followed in finding bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional.15 In 2013, in
Windsor v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court struck the definitional
provision of DOMA as an unconstitutional liberty deprivation.16 As of June 26,
2015, when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the Obergefell decision, 37
states and the District of Columbia recognized same-sex marriage.17 While this
turnaround was rapid in constitutional time, it was painfully slow in the lived
experiences of LGBT couples who were denied the right to marry.
In Obergefell, the U.S. Supreme Court held, 5-4, that both the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require
states to issue marriage licenses for same-sex marriages and to recognize samesex marriages when those marriages have been licensed lawfully in other
jurisdictions:
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest
ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a
marital union, two people become something greater than once they
were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage
embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would
misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of
marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that
twenty-nine states, most of which already had legislative prohibitions on the books, passed state
constitutional amendments limiting relationship recognition for same-sex couples.”).
11 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
13 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (2003).
14 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
15 See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v.
Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407
(Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865
(N.M. 2013).
16
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
17 Bill Chappell, Supreme Court Declares Same-Sex Marriage Legal in All 50 States, NPR, June
26, 2015, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/26/417717613/supreme-court-rules-allstates-must-allow-same-sex-marriages.
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they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be
condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization's
oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.
The Constitution grants them that right.18

Obergefell v. Hodges19 is essentially this generation’s Loving v.
Virginia.20 Yet, the sad reality is that the right to same-sex marriage is just the
beginning of a conversation. As Vice President Joe Biden pointed out, “LGBT
people can get married in the morning and fired in the afternoon because of their
sexual orientation or gender identity in 28 states.”21 Since the Obergefell
decision, the backlash has been swift, with a number of public officials claiming
the “right” to ignore the command of the U.S. Supreme Court and refuse to issue
marriage licenses because of individual religious objections.22 Despite public
accommodations laws, some service providers are refusing to serve gay
couples.23 These efforts toward nullification are reminiscent of the resistance
after Brown v. Board of Education.24
The aftermath of Obergefell is just beginning. The authors in this
symposium evaluate the opinion, reflect on it, and forecast for the future the
anticipated legal and social consequences of the Court’s recognition of the
constitutional right to marry a same-sex partner.
The batting line-up25 for this Symposium is spectacular.
Like many of the contributors to this symposium, Elvia Arriola has been
at the forefront of writing and theorizing about LGBT rights since a decade
before the acronym came into being.26 Her contribution to this symposium,
Queer, Undocumented, and Sitting in an Immigration Detention Center: A PostObergefell Reflection,27 focuses on a particular sub-group of queer folks: LGBT

18

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
Id.
20 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens
of Marriage, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 107, 113 (2015) (calling Loving “the closest analogous case”).
21 Married in the Morning, Fired in the Afternoon: The State of LGBT Anti-Discrimination Laws in
the U.S., TOWLEROAD, Aug. 3, 2015, http://www.towleroad.com/2015/08/married-in-the-morningfired-in-the-afternoon-the-state-of-lgbt-anti-discrimination-laws-in-the-u-s.
22 See Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail over Deal on Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-same-sexmarriage.html?_r=0.
23 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. 14CA1351, 2015 WL 4760453 (Colo. App. Aug. 13,
2015) (holding that a bakery’s refusal to sell a wedding cake to a gay couple violated the state’s
antidiscrimination statutes).
24 See, e.g., JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2007).
25 Forgive me. The Kansas City Royals just won the World Series.
26 Elvia R. Arriola, Coming Out and Coming to Terms with Sexual Identity, 68 TUL. L. REV.
283(1993); Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory, 9
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 103 (1994); Elvia R. Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution,
Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 263 (1988).
27 84 UMKC L. REV. 615 (2016).
19
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undocumented migrants who are placed in immigration detention. She weaves in
narratives of the lived experiences of these people—a technique that contributed
powerfully to the recognition of the right to same-sex marriage—to reveal the
specific obstacles and humiliations suffered by members of this group. While
Arriola’s article spotlights one group of queer rights-seekers, her article explores
a much larger theme of how to open doors, both metaphorically and legally, for
LGBT outsiders.
It is so fitting that Carlos Ball is one of the authors of this symposium.
He was one of the first law professors in the nation to broach the discussion
about same-sex marriage nearly twenty years ago.28 He has gone on to address,
with empirical social science evidence, the impact of LGBT parenting on
children.29 For many years Professor Ball has been at the forefront of gay rights
philosophy discourse as well as its constitutional jurisprudence.30
His contribution, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, evaluates the role of
bigotry in the opposition to same-sex marriage.31 He points out, on the one hand,
that not all and probably not even most people who defend the traditional view of
marriage as between opposite-sex individuals are bigoted. Yet, on the other
hand, Ball critiques the argument that those who make constitutional claims
about marriage equality are implicitly accusing opponents of bigotry. Ball points
out a serious omission in the Court’s decision in Obergefell: while it addressed
the consequences of same-sex marriage bans, it ignored the motivations behind
those bans. It is important to understand this “sanitized” version of the history of
the same-sex marriage debate because, going forward into the future of LGBT
rights, it will be necessary to evaluate which arguments are “judgments about the
attributes, characteristics, and values of same-sex relationships.”32
Naomi Cahn and June Carbone are the preeminent theorists in this
country on various states’ legal rules regarding marriage and the social meaning
28

Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond
Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871 (1997).
29 Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay
and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253. In case you were wondering, the punch line is that
children raised by gay and lesbian parents are no more likely to become LBGT than the children of
straight/heterosexual parents, and show no appreciable differences along dimensions of
psychosocial development, but do seem to display less sex stereotyping, and were seen by parents
and teachers as “‘more affectionate, more responsive, and more protective toward younger
children.’” Id. at 294.
30 Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443 (2000); Carlos A.
Ball, Essentialism and Universalism in Gay Rights Philosophy: Liberalism Meets Queer Theory, 26
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 271 (2001); Carlos A. Ball, The Immorality of Statutory Restrictions on
Adoption by Lesbians and Gay Men, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 379 (2007); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive
in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1184 (2004); Carlos A. Ball, Sexual Ethics and Postmodernism in Gay Rights
Philosophy, 80 N.C. L. REV. 371 (2002); Carlos A. Ball, Why Liberty Judicial Review Is as
Legitimate as Equality Review: The Case of Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1
(2011).
31 Carlos Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC L. REV. 637 (2016).
32 Id. at 658.
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of empirical data about family formation.33 Cahn and Carbone observe that in
Obergefell, the Supreme Court upheld same-sex marriage rights, but left open
another important determinant of family formation—parenthood. The marital
presumption, that children born during a marriage are children of the marital
partners, still exists, and presumably will apply to a same-sex married couple as
well. However, same-sex and opposite sex couples are not situated similarly in
relation to the presumption. Cahn and Carbone explore the complexities of the
continued existence of the marital presumption, particularly in light of the states’
differential approaches to the regulation of surrogacy and when states confer
parental status on intended parents. They conclude:
As Obergefell prompts a larger cultural conversation about the meaning
of marriage, this leads to increased examination of the link between
marriage and parenthood, to further analysis and, perhaps, broader
acceptance of surrogacy, and, potentially, to wider acknowledgement of
the role of three parents in a child’s life.34

Professor Mary Anne Case’s scholarship is a panoramic sweep of
theorizing about the laws regarding sexual orientation, from constitutional
history,35 to contemporary statutory frameworks and proposed legislation,36 from
constitutional theory to jurisprudence.37 Her article for this Symposium. Missing
Sex Talk in the Supreme Court’s Same-Sex Marriage Cases, centers on what the
Supreme Court left out of Obergefell and Windsor. What is missing from these
same-sex marriage opinion is the sex, in two ways: the Court omitted analysis
about prohibitions on same-sex marriage as sex discrimination and also elides
any discussion of sexual expression or sexuality.38

33

See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE
AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2011); Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple:
Religious Shades of Family Law, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 459 (2007); Naomi Cahn & June Carbone,
Growing Inequality and Children, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 283 (2015); June Carbone
& Naomi Cahn, The End of Men or the Rebirth of Class?, 93 B.U. L. REV. 871 (2013).
34 June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption Post-Obergefell, 84
UMKC L. REV. 661 (2016).
35 Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History
of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643 (1993).
36 Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s
Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of
ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (2014).
37 Mary Anne Case, A Lot to Ask: Review Essay of Martha Nussbaum’s From Disgust to Humanity:
Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 89 (2010); Mary Anne
Case, Why “Live-and-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious
Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463 (2015).
38 Mary Anne Case, Missing Sex Talk in the Supreme Court’s Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 84
UMKC L. REV. 673 (2016).
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Like many of the other authors in this Symposium, David Cruz has been
writing about LGBT issues for the better part of two decades.39 Many of his
previous articles address changing cultural views about sexuality, sexual
orientation, and gender and the evaluation of identity issues in constitutional
doctrine. In his contribution to this Symposium, Transgender Rights After
Obergefell,40 Cruz points out that the decision assists transgender people in
attaining recognition for their marriages no matter their pre- or post-transition
sex. But Obergefell recognizes only a small slice of identity rights as deserving
of constitutional protection. Many battles remain that, as Cruz notes, are “critical
to trans persons’ safety and security,” such as passports, driver’s licenses, and
school records.41 And, unlike Obergefell, which accepted “a right to marry that
was already repeatedly recognized as fundamental in Supreme Court
precedents,”42 other rights may be more difficult to secure because they lack the
foundational precedent.
Suzanne Goldberg, now Columbia’s Executive Vice President for
University Life and Director of the Law School’s Center for Gender and
Sexuality Law, has been on the front lines of litigating LGBT rights cases.
Before she entered the academy, she was a senior attorney with the Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, where she served as co-counsel on two
groundbreaking U.S. Supreme Court cases, Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v.
Texas.43 For two decades now, she has written about the global politics of LGBT
persecution,44 anti-gay initiatives,45 how to litigate political inequalities,46 and, of
particular relevance to the present sea change in LGBT rights, constitutional
tipping points.47
In her article for this Symposium, Goldberg begins with the stories of
people she used to represent in practice—stories of love and loss experienced by
LGBT parents, partners, and children, who suffered from the absence of legal
39 See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of
Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1297 (1999); David B. Cruz, The Defense of Marriage Act
and Uncategorical Federalism, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 805 (2011); David B. Cruz,
Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2002); David B. Cruz, “Just Don’t Call It
Marriage”: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
925 (2001); David B. Cruz, United States v. Windsor, Marriage, and the Dangers of Discernment,
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 505 (2014).
40 84 UMKC L. REV. 693 (2016).
41 Id. at 696.
42 Id. at 700.
43 Joy Y. Wang, Suzanne B. Goldberg: Liberty and Justice, COLUM. L. SCH. MAG., Summer 2011,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/magazine/60105/suzanne-b-goldberg.
44 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death: Political Asylum and the Global
Persecution of Lesbians and Gay Men, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 605 (1993).
45 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Facing the Challenge: A Lawyer’s Response to Anti-Gay Initiatives, 55
OHIO ST. L.J. 665 (1994).
46 Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist Arguments in
Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629 (2002).
47 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and FactBased Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2006).
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recognition of their family relationships.48 She points out that while the
Obergefell decision is an important cultural signifier, some companies are
withdrawing partner benefits because of the availability of same-sex marriage.
She urges family recognition as an independent and more robust theory of rights
which would provide more comprehensive health care coverage as well as the
right to be free from antigay discrimination.
Dean Tiffany Graham has written about same-sex marriage and the
theory of the liberal state,49 the prospects of domestic partner benefits in a world
of mini-DOMAs,50 and concepts of immutability in the early gay rights cases.51
Graham has been a scholar who draws on history, jurisprudence, and large-scale
arguments about constitutional structure in the quest for marriage equality. Her
contribution to this Symposium, Obergefell and Resistance, traces the types of
resistance leading up to the decision, and documents the new patterns of delays
and requests for religious accommodation that have followed the decision in very
short order.52
Aaron House, formerly a professor at UMKC School of Law, is now a
partner at House Packard, a law firm that specializes in LGBT rights law. Aaron
left the academy especially to protect people who identify as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgendered.53 A co-founder and member of the Board of
Directors of KC Legal (Kansas City LEsbian, Gay, and Allied Lawyers), Aaron
has been recognized as a Rising Star in Missouri and Kansas by Super Lawyers.
In his article, Obergefell’s Impact on Wrongful Death in Missouri and Kansas,
House spins Obergefell into the future, where he sees a number of “relatively
unexplored and certainly untried” benefits stemming from the decision.54 Among
these claims are suits by same-sex spouses and non-genetically related children
of same-sex parents, under presumptive parentage statutes, for loss of consortium
and wrongful death.
Nancy Knauer’s many years of scholarship on LGBT issues have often
focused on groups that are in the shadows (within an already at times closeted
population). Her earlier scholarship focused on victims of same-sex domestic
violence, LGBT youths, LGBT elders, and people harmed by the

48

Suzanne B. Goldberg, Reflections on Obergefell and the Family Recognition Framework’s
Continuing Value, 84 UMKC L. REV. 707 (2016).
49 Tiffany C. Graham, Something Old, Something New: Civic Virtue and the Case for Same-Sex
Marriage, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 53 (2008).
50 Tiffany C. Graham, Exploring the Impact of the Marriage Amendments: Can Public Employers
Offer Domestic Partner Benefits to Their Gay and Lesbian Employees?, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
83 (2009).
51 Tiffany C. Graham, The Shifting Doctrinal Face of Immutability, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 169
(2011).
52 Tiffany C. Graham, Obergefell and Resistance, 84 UMKC L. REV. 715 (2016).
53 Aaron M. House, HousePackard, LLC, http://www.housepackard.com/aaron/.
54 Aaron M. House, Obergefell’s Impact on Wrongful Death in Missouri and Kansas, 84 UMKC L.
REV. 733, 734 (2016).
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heteronormative tax code.55 In this Symposium, she writes about the push toward
religious exemptions, which began before the Obergefell decision and have
skyrocketed since. These range from bills in state legislatures that are
particularized “Religious Freedom Restoration Acts” to sweeping state
enactments that allow private businesses as well as clergy members to refuse
services to LGBT individuals and couples based on religious objections. Knauer
makes it clear that when anti-gay religious beliefs, fully protected under the Free
Exercise Clause, “translate into public action they traditionally step over the line
and become subject to state regulation.”56 Permitting religious exemptions to
undermine civil rights has no theoretical limitation—it would not end with
marriage rights, but instead would reach vaccinations, gun control, and
environmental standards. Knauer concludes that religious exemptions should not
“function as trumps and hold objectors harmless from laws of general
applicability.”57
Zachary Kramer’s scholarship centers on discrimination based on
sexual orientation and possible remedies for it.58 While his focus is on LGBT
rights in the employment arena, he often—as he does with his contribution to this
Symposium—looks both backward and forward in time. In his article, Before
and After Obergefell, Kramer writes that before the decision, the issue of
marriage equality already seemed “stale because it is an idea who time should
have come by now.”59 After the decision, Kramer worries about the “paradox”
that approval of same-sex marriage may shut the door on other “options for
formal coupling,” such as domestic partnerships.60 It is an important reminder
that while Obergefell was essential to marriage equality, people will stand in
various different relations to the decision, and it is vital to recognize that.
Kim Pearson’s scholarship explores the ways in which race and sexual
orientation factor in adoption and custody decisions.61 Her larger project over
55 Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129 (1998);
Nancy J. Knauer, LGBT Elder Law: Toward Equity in Aging, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1 (2009);
Nancy J. Knauer, LGBT Youth: Reconciling Pride, Family, and Community, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 297 (2014); Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic
Sphere While Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 325 (1999).
56 Nancy J. Knauer, Religious Exemptions, Marriage Equality, and the Establishment of Religion,
84 UMKC L. REV. 749, 782 (2016).
57 Id. at 795.
58 Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional Discrimination, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 651 (2009); Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 NW. U.L. REV.
205 (2009); Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891 (2014); Zachary
A. Kramer, Some Preliminary Thoughts on Title VII’s Intersexions, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 31
(2006).
59 Zachary A. Kramer, Before and After Obergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 797, 798 (2016).
60 Id. at 801.
61 See Kim H. Pearson, Displaced Mothers, Absent and Unnatural Fathers: LGBT Transracial
Adoption, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 149 (2012); Kim H. Pearson, Legal Solutions for APA
Transracial Adoptees, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1179 (2013); Kim H. Pearson, Mimetic Reproduction of
Sexuality in Child Custody Decisions, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 53 (2010); Kim H. Pearson,
Sexuality in Child Custody Decisions, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 280 (2012).
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time has been to evaluate the roles of discourse and social behavior shape norms
regarding sexual orientation.62
In the aftermath of Obergefell, religious individuals and groups are
making claims that expansion of LGBT rights intrudes on their free exercise
rights. Pearson anticipates an argument that religionists may make—“by
analogizing religiosity to other identity traits that are considered innate and
receive legal protection.”63 She then explores the science of religiosity,
concluding that brains are not hard wired to be religious, let alone any particular
type of religion. She distinguishes the extension of legal protection to parents in
custody situations to raise their children in a religious environment from the
claims that religious objectors to LGBT rights somehow deserve protection
because their religious beliefs are innate.
Ruthann Robson is acknowledged as one of the founders and
contemporary leading figures of lesbian legal theory, a pioneer of the storytelling
or narrative movement in legal philosophy, and one who, through her energy and
intellectual courage, has helped transform lesbian jurisprudence into a powerful
social movement.64 The other half of Professor Robson’s writings are in the
humanities: she is an exceedingly accomplished author of fiction, poetry, and
creative nonfiction.65
Robson’s contribution to this Symposium engages in a fascinating trope:
she answers the question of what the Obergefell decision would look like if
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, instead of Justice Anthony Kennedy, had authored
the Court’s opinion.66 The short answer, according to Robson, is that “it would
have been more doctrinally rigorous; it would have been less sentimental; and it
would have jurisprudential integrity.”67
David Schraub has recently burst onto the national scene as an
accomplished and inspiring scholar.68 In earlier works, he has addressed the dark
side of social movement victories—which can create, as he terms it, “sticky,”

62 Kim H. Pearson, Patriotic Homosocial Discourse, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 627, 629
(2006); Kim Hai Pearson, The Sacra of LGBT Childhood, 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 55 (2014).
63 Kim H. Pearson, Innate Religious Identity, 84 UMKC L. REV. 803, 834 (2016).
64 See Symposium to Honor the Work of Professor Ruthann Robson, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 313
(2005). See also RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN OUTLAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
(1992); RUTHANN ROBSON & MARTIN DUBERMAN, GAY MEN, LESBIANS, AND THE LAW (ISSUES IN
GAY & LESBIAN LIFE) (1995); Ruthann Robson, Thirteen False Blackbirds, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 315 (2013).
65 See, e.g., RUTHANN ROBSON, A/K/A (1997); RUTHANN ROBSON, ANOTHER MOTHER (1995);
RUTHANN ROBSON, CECILE: STORIES (1991); Ruthann Robson, Footnotes: A Story of Seduction, 75
UMKC L. REV. 1181 (2007).
66 Justice Ginsburg’s Obergefell v. Hodges, 84 UMKC L. REV. 837 (2016).
67 Id. at 838.
68 See, e.g., David Schraub, The Perils and Promise of the Holder Memo, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV.
DE NOVO 187 (2012); David Schraub, Comment, The Price of Victory: Political Triumphs and
Judicial Protection in the Gay Rights Movement, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1437 (2010).
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instead of slippery slopes that slow down progress toward equality.69 In his
contribution to this Symposium, The Siren Song of Strict Scrutiny, Schraub
argues that part of the power in the Obergefell holding is that it reached the
conclusion of marriage equality through rational basis review.70 Looking
backward, he notes that efforts to make sexual orientation into a suspect
classification guided some litigation efforts. The benefit of heightened scrutiny
is that it targets overt and purposeful discrimination; the bane of it is that it can
reinforce marginalization. Going forward, Schraub urges steerage away from
strict scrutiny “as a means of directly addressing ongoing inequalities.”71
From early writings on the prospects for same-sex marriage and on
making sex discrimination arguments for LGBT rights,72 to work the social and
legal conditions for LGBT individuals in cyberspace,73 to work on immutability
arguments in sexual orientation rights debates,74 to his book, The Mismeasure of
Desire: The Science, Theory, and Ethics of Sexual Orientation,75 Edward Stein’s
pathbreaking scholarship is at the intersection of sexual orientation, bioethics,
and philosophy. In his contribution for this Symposium, Plural Marriage, Group
Marriage and Immutability in Obergefell v. Hodges and Beyond, Stein takes on
the “polygamy challenge” to same-sex marriage rights.76 During oral argument
in Obergefell, Justice Alito questioned whether a ruling that upheld same-sex
marriage would open the door to bigamous or polygamous marriages. Stein
makes several important distinctions between same-sex and multiple marriages,
centering on the idea that “in contrast to the ‘immutable’ desire of people who
want to marry people of the same sex, the desire of people who want to marry
more than one person at the same time is ‘mutable,’ and thus, the latter desire
need not be accommodated by the state.”77
MARC POIRIER
The UMKC Law Review dedicates this symposium to the memory of
Marc Poirier. Marc was a Professor of Law and the Martha Traylor Research

69

David Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1249 (2013).
David Schraub, The Siren Song of Strict Scrutiny, 84 UMKC L. REV. 859 (2016).
71 Id. at 865.
72 Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49
UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001); Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United
States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611 (2004); Edward Stein, Symposium
on Abolishing Civil Marriage: An Introduction, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1155 (2006).
73 Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (2003).
74 Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights,
89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597 (2014).
75 EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION (2001).
76 84 UMKC L. REV. 871, 872 (2016).
77 Edward Stein, Plural Marriage, Group Marriage and Immutability in Obergefell v. Hodges and
Beyond. 84 UMKC L. REV. 871, 872 (2016).
70
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Scholar at Seton Hall School of Law. From his early work on gender
stereotypes,78 to articles about the intersection of property and LGBT theory,79
Marc was a brilliant scholar, and one who never shied from having difficult
conversations.80
Marc was writing a contribution for this symposium, with a tentative title
of “When Obergefell met Hobby Lobby,” when we received word that he would
be unable to complete the piece. Below is the precis of the article he was
planning to write, sent in an email:
I have wanted the opportunity to articulate my peculiar
place/space/identity view of the exception claimed under the federal
RFRA in Hobby Lobby and that will be claimed under mini-RFRAs in
many states. Indiana appears to be leading the way. I see this as a
continued localism fight between on the one hand same-sex couples
who wish their legal recognition to carry over into privately owned
public accommodations and other businesses, so that they have a
uniform playing field in which to undertake their microperformances as
a married couple; and businesses and other institutions (e.g., Wheaton
College) which wish to define the local territory they own in terms of a
religiously-based definition of marriage that allows them to perform
their religious identity by excluding or making invisible same-sex
couples and marriages. I suppose one question here is whether Hobby
Lobby (RFRA protects against a statutory requirement in the
Affordable Care Act) still applies when the protection being resisted on
religion grounds comes from a constitutional guarantee, which you
anticipate Obergefell will declare. Which might get us to the
constitutional issue not reached in Hobby Lobby, but lurking in
Hosanna-Tabor.81

I include this description of his topic in the hopes of provoking thought
regarding his interesting take on the issue—which, frankly, was a talent of
Marc’s. A brief Westlaw search of his name shows more than four hundred
citations to the influence of his work, and numerous additional footnotes
thanking Marc for his generosity of time and talent in reviewing drafts of other
people’s work and providing helpful advice.

78 Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1073 (1999); Marc R. Poirier,
Hastening the Kulturkampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of American
Masculinity, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 271 (2003).
79 Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim Within the Same-Sex Marriage Controversy, 17
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343 (2008).
80 Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and the Marriage
Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2008); Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling:
Identifying Stigma in the “Civil Union”/”Marriage” Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1425 (2009);
Marc R. Poirier, Place, Space, and Territory as Frontiers for LGBTQ Scholarship, 19 LAW &
SEXUALITY 188 (2010).
81 Email from Marc Poirier to Nancy Levit, Mar. 28, 2015, on file with author. Oh, I wish we could
have read the article.
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A tribute to Marc appeared on The Faculty Lounge blog after his
passing.82 Commenters remarked on Marc’s brilliance, his kindness, and his
other-directedness. Mark Wojcik capsulized it well when he said: “Marc was a
model for the best in academia: he shared ideas and applied them to make the
world a better place.”83 We hope to carry on Marc’s tradition in this symposium.

82

Alfred Brophy, Marc Poirier (1952-2015), THE FACULTY LOUNGE, Aug. 3, 2015,
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2015/08/marc-poirier.html.
83 Id.
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